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Federal and state policy makers, consumers, health plans, providers, and other stakeholders are 
interested in the benefits and disadvantages of integrating acute and long term care financing in 
rural areas.  To date, experience with integrated financing is limited and is based largely in urban 
areas.  This paper reviews current research and experience and identifies key policy and 
program considerations for integrated financing in rural areas. 
 
Why Integrate Financing? 
 
A major concern with fee-for-service reimbursement is that it forces consumers and providers 
into rigid categories of service, whether or not those services truly meet consumers' needs. This 
is a particular concern when long term care is needed, because public long term care is funded 
primarily by Medicaid while public acute care is funded primarily by Medicare.  The bifurcation of 
these two important funding sources results in perverse incentives to shift costs and to 
maximize reimbursement rather than providing the most appropriate level of care to consumers.  
The hope of integrated financing is that it will provide the financial incentives and flexibility needed 
to deliver to consumers the appropriate level of care without regard to funding source.  
 
The Urban Model: Financial Integration through Full Capitation  
 
Integration of acute and long term care financing has been tested primarily in urban areas, and 
the central design feature has been capitation.  Many variations exist, but the general approach 
has been to create a flexible pool of acute (Medicare) and long term care (Medicaid) dollars at 
the health plan or provider system level.  For each enrolled beneficiary, the State makes a 
capitated Medicaid payment and the federal Health Care Financing Administration makes a 
capitated Medicare payment to a single accountable entity.  That entity (an HMO, Provider-
Sponsored Organization or other qualified risk-bearing organization) must provide all covered 
services and is at financial risk for costs that exceed the capitation, but is freed from many fee-
for-service rules.  The entity has a financial incentive to provide or pay for any service that is 
likely to prevent more expensive needs down the road, such as hospital or institutional long term 
care.  Capitation allows downward substitution of services when appropriate, makes budgets 
more predictable for payers and allows a greater focus on consumer outcomes by focusing 
accountability on a single entity responsible for total care.    
 
Full Capitation Often Not Viable in Rural Areas 
 
Full capitation is rare is rural areas.  Financial integration through full capitation of acute and long 
term care payments has not been widely replicated in rural areas. Two PACE sites (Program of 
All-inclusive Care for the Elderly), based in Columbia, South Carolina and Eau Claire, Wisconsin, 
are fully capitated for both Medicare and Medicaid.  Both sites provide services in rural areas but 
are based in small cities.  The Arizona Long Term Care System (ALTCS) provides capitated 
Medicaid long term care services statewide, but Medicare payments remain fee-for-service, 
protecting ALTCS contractors from acute care risk. The lack of experience in rural areas is not 
surprising, because capitation works best where there are large numbers of potential members 
and providers.  A large member base allows managed care organizations to spread risk, and a 
large provider base gives them leverage in negotiating discounted rates. 
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Capitation may be counter to rural health provider goals:  In many rural areas, preservation 
of existing provider infrastructure is an explicit goal.  Depending on the type of provider, capitation 
can have the opposite effect.  Capitation provides a financial incentive to the accountable entity 
(e.g., HMO, PSO) to use less expensive care.  Rural hospitals, for example, should expect to 
receive fewer referrals from a capitated integrated care entity.  Likewise, home health agencies 
might lose business as integrated entities learn how to substitute home care (provided by 
personal care assistants) for home health (provided by nurses).  Furthermore, the integrated 
entity will want to negotiate discounts from providers, diminishing revenue per unit of service. 
 
Many rural areas lack managed care infrastructure:  Full capitation models require managed 
care infrastructure that often does not exist in rural areas.  A financially healthy organization must 
be available and willing to bear the financial risk that comes with accepting capitated payments.  
In urban areas, HMOs, Provider-Sponsored Organizations and other managed care entities have 
played this role, but they have shied away from Medicare and Medicaid programs in rural areas.   
The alternative, developing a home-grown organization, is very difficut.  With insurance laws in 
most states requiring such organizations to have reserves of $500,000 to $1 million, financially 
strapped local providers can not step forward, and those that have the resources may not wish 
to get into the risk management business because the incentives of capitation are generally 
opposite the familiar incentives of fee-for-service payment.   
 
High hopes for the BBA have not materialized.  Changes in reimbursement for Medicare risk 
organizations were enacted in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 to make rural areas more 
attractive to risk-bearing organizations over time, but no significant increase of Medicare 
managed care has been observed in rural areas to date.  It is too early to tell how modifications 
enacted in the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 will 
impact rural infrastructure.  The Refinement Act provided additional incentives to 
Medicare+Choice plans to expand into rural areas, but those incentives may be offset by several 
provisions that delay or mitigate BBA fee-for-service provisions for providers.  To the extent that 
rural providers feel less immediate financial pressure from BBA , they may be less inclined to 
negotiate with prospective Medicare+Choice plans or to launch provider-based plans of their 
own.  
 
Rural Alternatives to Full Capitation 
 
A conclusion of the HCFA-sponsored evaluation of Social HMOs was that integrated financing is 
necessary but not sufficient to integrate services.  Does this suggest that rural areas need not 
try, given the difficulty of implementing full capitation models?  Some policy makers and program 
designers are experimenting with incremental strategies to determine whether some or all of the 
benefits of service intergration can be achieved with less than full financial integration.  
Approaches include managed fee-for-service, partial capitation and other risk limitation 
mechanisms. 
 
Managed fee-for-service refers to models that continue to pay for services on a fee-for-
service basis, but manage the services in various ways.  For example, the MaineNET 
Demonstration Program in rural Maine is designed as a Primary Care Case Management 
(PCCM) program, in which physician practices serve as gatekeepers for services.  The 
physicians partner with the State’s designated agency to provide care management when 
patients need long term care.  The State provides utilization reports to participating practices.  A 
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logical next step is to select quality indicators discernible from the claims data and reward 
practices that achieve desired outcomes.  While this approach promotes better management of 
existing services and can include appropriate financial incentives, it does not promote flexibility or 
substitution of services, since payments are still triggered by providing services that have been 
predefined as reimbursable. 
 
Partial capitation refers to payment systems in which some services are prepaid through 
capitation but some remain fee-for-service.  In a rural setting, this can be a way of containing risk 
for a nascent local organization while still allowing some flexibility of services and providing 
incentives for efficiency.  Depending on how the capitated payment is structured, it can also 
allow an organization to avoid being treated as an HMO or other risk-bearing entity subject to 
large risk reserve requirements.  Key policy questions include what to capitate and how to avoid 
cost-shifting to the fee-for-service side of the equation.  In general, program designers should 
consider leaving in fee-for-service those services they want to promote (e.g., home care) and 
capitating services that are overutilized.  An example of a partial capitation strategy is the one 
used with the Wisconsin Partnership Program site in Eau Claire.  Medicaid services were 
partially capitated, and Medicare services remained entirely fee-for-service during a multi-year 
start-up period.  Both (Medicare and Medicaid) became fully capitated after the site had gained 
considerable experience. 
 
Other risk limitation mechanisms include risk corridors and reinsurance.  Risk corridors 
define the ways in which losses and profits are divided between a plan or program and a payer. 
For example, in the Program for All-inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE), risk corridors were 
used in the first three start-up years of the program to provide the time necessary to develop and 
refine the service system.  If a program's revenues exceeded its expenditures, a risk reserve 
was created that was used to fund losses or create a risk reserve for future years.  If the 
program's expenditures exceeded its revenues, the losses were shared by the program and the 
payer.  The use or purchase of re-insurance for high cost cases is another method of reducing 
financial risk.  Re-insurance can be structured in a number of different ways.  In Arizona, the 
State buys commercial reinsurance that covers the cost of care for individual cases that exceed 
certain thresholds.  For catastophic cases associated with certain pre-defined conditions, such 
as transplants or hemophilia, the reinsurance covers either a certain percentage of the costs or 
a pre-established amount for the condition.  In other states, the Medicaid agency itself offers re-




Full capitation of acute and long term care payments is an urban financial integration model that 
is often not applicable in rural areas.  Many rural areas do not have adequate infrastructure to 
support full capitation models, nor are such models necessarily consistent with the common 
rural area goal of preserving and strengthening existing providers. 
 
Rural areas may still want to pursue service integration to achieve greater flexibility and less 
fragmentation of services.  A number of incremental payment approaches are more feasible for 
these areas than full capitation, yet still support some integration of services.  These include the 
creationof fee-for-service incentives, partial capitation and other risk limitation strategies. 
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Financing Options for Integration in Rural Areas 
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can be shared with 
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Cost shifting to fee for 
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with low population 
base and low 
penetration of 
established managed 
care providers.   
May conflict with goals 
of local area providers 
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I. Introduction 
A major concern with fee-for-service reimbursement is that it forces consumers into 
rigid categories of service, whether or not those services truly meet their needs. This is a 
particular concern when long term care is needed, because community-based long term 
care services tend to be under-funded, resulting in overuse of substitutes that are 
expensive and medical in nature, such as hospital, nursing home and home health care.  
The hope of integration is that consumers will get the appropriate level of care when they 
need it. This is premised on a fundamental re-ordering of financial incentives, in which 
providers are financially motivated and work together to substitute high-touch for high-tech 
services whenever clinically appropriate.  
The urban response to perverse fee-for-service incentives has been to experiment 
with capitated Medicare and Medicaid payments that integrate acute and long term care 
funding, creating flexible pools of dollars at the plan or provider system level, to be used to 
provide what the consumer needs when the consumer needs it, regardless of whether it 
appears on a list of approved services.  In addition to providing flexibility, capitation 
reverses the incentives:  hospital days and long-term nursing home stays become costly 
services  to use sparingly, while sub-acute care, ambulatory care, home care and various 
forms of residential care become attractive substitutes demanded by the plan, stimulating 
development of the marketplace with little need for government planning.   
Combining Medicaid and Medicare funds also integrates the acute and long term 
care financing and reduces opportunities for cost shifting.  For example, current 
implementation of prospective reimbursement for Medicare home health is expected to 
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result in a cost-shift to Medicaid home health, particularly for higher-cost beneficiaries who 
need more service than agencies can provide within Medicare reimbursement limits.  For 
dually eligible beneficiaries, agencies may be able to move patients from Medicare to 
Medicaid funding streams.  
 Can capitation really work such wonders for rural long term care systems?  To date, 
there is precious little experience with capitated, integrated care, and what does exist is 
mostly in urban areas.  While the intuitive appeal of capitation is undeniable, we should 
carefully analyze whether it is feasible in rural areas and what its implications are for 
various stakeholders in rural health care.   Rural health program designers must ensure that 
the payment and financing systems they develop:  
• support specific program goals; and 
• are compatible with available service delivery vehicles and local market conditions.  
II. Financing and Payment Must Support Specific Program Goals.   
Any  financing and payment system for an integrated long term care system must be 
tailored to meet the specific goals of the program and the people and the area served by 
the program.  A key question is whether rural integration projects share the goals of the 
urban demonstrations undertaken to date. Common goals have included the following:  
• To pay plans and providers fair and reasonable amounts, while promoting 
efficiency and financial accountability;   
• To diminish opportunities for cost shifting between acute and long term care; 
• To provide incentives for high quality of care; and 
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• To support the right care at the right time generally, and to encourage the use of 
home- and community-based services specifically. 
Integration of multiple funding streams (e.g.; Medicaid, Medicare, State-funded 
home care, Older Americans Act services, etc.) through capitation is attractive because it 
is at least a theoretically straight forward approach that can support all the goals above, 
particularly if the goals are specifically considered in determining the specifics of the 
capitation.  
It may be, however, that the goals of a rural integration project are different from or in 
conflict with the goals listed above, and that capitation is therefore unnecessary or likely to 
produce unintended results.  Program specific goals in rural areas are likely to be modest 
and incremental.  For example, goals of a rural program may include the following: 
• To protect local providers, such as hospitals and nursing homes.  In many rural 
communities, the cumulative pressures of Medicare prospective hospital 
payments (DRGs), phase-out of Medicaid disproportionate share hospital 
payments (DSH), and recently implemented skilled nursing and home health 
prospective payments threaten the financial viability of facilities and agencies 
that comprise the heart of the health care system and are often the largest 
employers in the community.  Depending on how the payment is structured, 
capitation could result in lower payments to these providers, since managed 
care organizations typically seek discounts from providers.  
• To develop a managed care infrastructure.  In some rural areas, a specific goal will 
be to move toward managed care principles by stimulating the development of 
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an integrated service delivery and financing infrastructure. This may include the 
development of provider networks to coordinate service delivery, the 
reorganization of medical staffs to monitor service use and quality across a 
spectrum of services, and  the development of administrative systems to gather 
data, pay providers and assume some financial risk.  In instances where entities 
do not exist or are not strong enough to bear full risk under capitation, other 
incremental approaches may need to be considered. 
• To expand access to services generally.  In many rural areas, health services are in 
short supply generally.  Capitation is not likely to solve a general health supply 
shortage problem.  In general, managed care entities depend on the opposite 
being true:  they extract discounts from health providers who have excess 
capacity and are therefore willing to negotiate discounts in return for volume.  
Integration through capitation also presumes a downward substitution of 
services, and is not designed to expand services across-the-board. 
 
III.   Financing and Payment Must be Compatible With Available Service Delivery 
Vehicles and Local Market Conditions. 
Conceptually it is possible to envision and design integrated service and financing 
systems that meet the particular goals of a rural community.  In practice, the organizational 
structures and financing systems must be compatible with available service delivery 
systems, local market conditions and the historical practice patterns in the area.  While a 
lot of attention has focused on the issue and need for integrated financing approaches, an 
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important question for rural areas is whether an organization can build the appropriate 
administrative, management and organizational systems to support integrated financing.   If 
not, the typical urban financing arrangement will not apply to a given rural integration effort, 
and attention will need to be given to one or more of the alternatives discussed in Section 
IV, below.  Risk-bearing integration vehicles that have emerged to date include commercial 
plans (including those that have Medicare risk contracts), Medicaid plans (including those 
formed by counties), and various forms of provider-sponsored plans.   
A. Commercial Plans (Including Medicare+Choice Plans) 
In areas with heavy or growing managed care penetration, commercial health plans 
have emerged as organizations willing to take on risk-based long term care integration.  
These have included Medicare plans, formerly known as Medicare HMOs or TEFRA 
HMOs, now known as Medicare+Choice plans under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 
(BBA).  Until the requirement was eliminated by the BBA, Medicare plans were required to 
have at least 50% commercial enrollment.  
The Texas Star+Plus demonstration is a recent example of a program that is 
integrating financing through commercial plans.  (University of Maryland, Center on Aging, 
1999)  The State contracts with three commercial HMOs and pays them a capitation for 
most Medicaid services, including long term care.  The demonstration is located in Harris 
County, dominated by Houston, the fourth largest city in the country.  The area was chosen 
by State Medicaid officials in part for its highly competitive market conditions and also 
because Harris County's Medicare managed care rates are above the national average.  
About half of the 54,000 beneficiaries targeted for Star+Plus were dually eligible for 
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Medicare and Medicaid, and the State wanted at least two of their plans to have Medicare 
risk contracts with HCFA so that full financial integration of Medicare and Medicaid 
payments could be achieved at the plan level. Because Medicare law guarantees a choice 
of fee-for-service to Medicare beneficiaries, however, financial integration is not assured in 
this "piggy back" model:  in the first year of the program, most dually eligible Star+Plus 
members have retained fee-for-service Medicare.     
Clearly, a number of urban factors influenced the financing scheme developed for 
Star+Plus, making it difficult to export to rural areas: 
• The Houston market is huge and commercial plans are competing fiercely for 
market share;   
• Through the mandatory Medicaid enrollment, the State offered plans a large risk 
pool of 54,000 lives; 
• Medicare managed care rates were above the national average in Harris County, 
offering rewards to plans that could receive capitated Medicare and Medicaid 
payments.  
 Like Texas, Maine had originally been drawn to Medicare HMOs as a convenient 
vehicle for integrating Medicaid and Medicare payments, but only one currently exists in the 
State, and it did not express interest in the MaineNET demonstration project.  The 
MaineNET counties, like nearly all Maine counties, have Medicare managed care rates 
that are below the national average. As a result the Maine demonstration was redesigned 
to reflect the local market conditions.  At this time a primary care case management 
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(PCCM) model is under development as an incremental approach to integration of 
services in a rural county in Maine.  (Maine Department of Human Services, 1999) 
To date, Medicare HMOs have had very little presence in rural areas generally.  This 
was due in large part to the relatively low Medicare capitation rates in rural areas, derived 
from fee-for-service average expenditures that have been lower historically in rural than in 
urban areas.  The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 reduces the gap between rural and urban 
rates by gradually blending national and local averages.  Rural areas with Medicare 
expenditures below the national average should see their rates rise, possibly making them 
more attractive to Medicare+Choice plans in the future. However, it is still too early to tell 
what the market response will be.   
In a Colorado demonstration involving a Medicare HMO, the BBA had a negative 
impact on Medicare rates and has forestalled the full financial integration originally planned 
for Mesa County, an area on Colorado’s western slope that is largely rural.  The proposed 
contractor, Rocky Mountain HMO, currently receives a Medicaid capitation from the State 
for primary and acute care and has had a Medicare cost contract with HCFA for several 
years.  Under the Colorado Integrated Care and Financing Project, Rocky Mountain HMO 
would have converted its Medicare cost contract to a risk contract, making it eligible for 
capitated Medicare payments from HCFA, and the State would have added to its existing 
capitation funding for Medicaid and State-only long term care services.  However, the BBA 
resulted in a lower Medicare rate than originally projected for the demonstration, making a 
Medicare capitation unfeasible. (University of Maryland, Center on Aging, 1999)  The State 
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is proceeding to add long term care to its capitation, but Medicare services will remain fee-
for-service.   
B. Medicaid Plans (Including Counties)  
As an alternative or supplement to commercial plans, Medicaid plans may offer a 
vehicle for risk-based integration.  Options include adding long term care to existing 
Medicaid primary and acute care plans, as Minnesota did to create its Senior Health 
Options program, or creating comprehensive plans through counties or other governmental 
entities that already have a stake in the long term care system. 
Minnesota contracts with three plans in its Senior Health Options (MSHO) 
demonstration, building on its longstanding Prepaid Medical Assistance Program (PMAP).  
Under PMAP, plans receive a Medicaid capitation for primary and acute care.  The State 
recognized that, for dually eligible beneficiaries, PMAP addresses only a small portion of 
care, since long term care services and Medicare services were not included in the 
capitatation.  The State developed a voluntary integrated option for dually eligible elderly 
beneficiaries that adds long term care to the Medicaid capitation and triggers a capitated 
Medicare payment from HCFA to the plan.  (Booth et. al., 1997) 
In Arizona, prior to the creation of the Arizona Long Term Care System (ALTCS) in 
1989, counties were responsible for long term care services.  Arizona was the only State 
not offering Medicaid long term care services, having only begun accepting federal 
matching dollars for primary and acute care in 1982 with the creation of its §1115 Arizona 
Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS).  When the State proposed adding 
ALTCS as a fully capitated primary, acute and long term care Medicaid program for low 
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income residents with significant long term care needs, many counties, including some in 
very rural parts of the State, created risk-bearing organizations to accept the capitated 
payments, which would include federal Medicaid matching funds for the first time.  ALTCS 
authorizing legislation recognized the unique historical role of counties by designating the 
two urban counties (Maricopa and Pima) as the State's exclusive ALTCS contractors in the 
Phoenix and Tucson areas, and the remaining thirteen counties were given first right of 
refusal in their areas.  (McCall and Korb, 1994)  The lesson from Arizona is that risk is 
relative.  With the promise of additional federal dollars and continuing control of the long 
term care system, taking a capitation was a feasible and manageable option.  
C. Provider Sponsored Organizations  
Since passage of the BBA, the term Provider Sponsored Organization (PSO) 
gained new attention as a type of managed care entity newly eligible to participate in the 
Medicare managed care program.  Here, we use the term more generally to refer to a 
provider-based organization that accepts risk for a comprehensive set of services through 
capitated payments. 
The Program for All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE) is an early example of a 
provider-based approach to risk-based integration that may be viable in some rural areas.  
Currently, at least one site, Palmetto SeniorCare based in Columbia, South Carolina, 
(population around 100,000) serves a sizable surrounding rural area. Designed to serve 
exclusively people whose needs qualify them for nursing home level of care, traditional 
PACE sites offer community-based long term care through staff physicians and 
interdisciplinary team members who have efficient access to members through their 
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attendance at day centers.  A site receives capitated Medicaid payments from the state 
and capitated Medicare payments from HCFA and is financially responsible for all care, 
contracting with hospitals and nursing homes for those services.   
PACE programs require significant start-up capital, estimated at $1-1.5 million. 
(State Work Group on PACE, 1999)  Start-up costs include capital renovation of a day 
center and operating losses for about the first 18-24 months, when centers operate below 
break-even census.  In the early days of the PACE demonstration, many of these costs 
were supported by The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, but new sites starting today 
must raise the capital.  Many PACE sites are sponsored by hospitals.  It is unclear whether 
PACE sites could be viable without an urban base.  Because PACE has a relatively 
narrow target group (dually eligible beneficiaries who are Medicaid eligible, nursing home 
certifiable and at least 55 years of age) and is entirely voluntary, sites have found it a 
constant challenge to maintain and exceed the break-even enrollment of 250-300.  
Assuming no greater than 25% penetration, existing sites advise launching a program only 
if at least 1,000 potential members live in the service area. (State Work Group on PACE, 
1999) 
 
IV. A Range of Financing and Payment Strategies 
The appeal of fully capitated financing models is conceptually attractive.  Capitation 
offers a flexible funding pool and, if multiple payers participate (most importantly, Medicaid 
and Medicare), perverse incentives to shift costs and use expensive services are 
diminished.  Most experience with capitation, however, is in urban areas, or at least areas 
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with an urban base.  It may be that, in order to achieve some degree of integration in rural 
settings (or at least better coordination of services),  alternatives to full capitation will be 
necessary.  
Financial integration can be thought of as a continuum ranging from full capitation of 
all services to coordinated fee-for-service incentives --- with many variations and 
combinations in between. While a single capitation rate is often viewed as a necessary 
feature of a fully integrated system, there are, in fact, many other financing and payment 
options available. Table 1 provides a summary of the financing options that are currently 
available or under consideration for integrated LTC service delivery  systems.  In fact, 
some of the moremodest and incremental approaches may be more suitable and 
desirable for rural areas.  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 1:  Financing Options for Long Term Care Integration in Rural Areas 
 Key Features  Risk Management  Pros/Cons for Rural 
Areas 
Examples 
Fee for Service Services paid on a per  unit  basis.  
Flexibility to substitute community 
based services for higher cost 
acute care services is limited. 
No risk to providers. 
Services coordination or 
management is minimal. 
 
Supports current delivery system.   
Managed Fee for 
Service/Coordination 
Uses FFS system but strengthens 
the management and coordination 
of services. 
PCP or care partner coordinates 
and authorizes service use. 
Little risk to providers or 
payers.   
Payers may pay fee for 
coordination of services by 
PCP. 
Requires access to data 
to monitor service use. 
Provides an incremental 
approach to integration of 
services.  
Viable option in areas with low 
managed care penetration. 
Programs that coordinate 
Medicaid and Medicare using a 
PCCM are untested.  
PCCM programs expanded to 
include LTC coordination.  
Mainenet is in the pre-
implementation stage. 
 
Partial Capitation  Some but not all services are 
included in the capitation payment.  
Partial capitation may be from 
Medicare and/or from Medicaid.  
Organization needs 
capacity to 
manage/monitor services.  
Responsibility for risk 
management, quality 
oversight, payment can be 
shared with other entities 
through ASO 
arrangements or HMO 
partners.  
Promotes cost consciousness 
and allows flexibility of benefits.   
Cost shifting to fee for service 
system is a problem.   
Difficult to administer and 
reconcile payments with payers.  
Medicare -- Carle Clinic as 
part of the Medicare 
Community Nursing Care 
Demonstration. Medicare 
component of  Mass. Senior 
Care Organization. 
Medicaid --- Minnesota Senior 
Health Options program.  
 
Full Capitation All inclusive payment rate paid to a 
single entity that is financially 
responsible for risk.  
Organization must have 
established network of 
providers, be able to pay 
providers, meet quality 
assurance standards and 
have systems capacity to 
monitor service use and 
reporting requirements.  
Risk can be shared 
through re-insurance, risk 
corridors, or risk pools.  
Difficult in rural areas with low 
population base and low 
penetration of established 
managed care providers.   
May conflict with goals of local 
area providers and  rural market 
conditions.  
PACE programs. 
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In the area of long term care in particular, the situation is complicated by the 
different payers and their rules and regulations  (e.g. Medicare payments for primary, acute 
and skilled level care, Medicaid long term care payments, nutrition and other services 
funded through the Older Americans Act, and private insurance that extends Medicare or 
provides long term care coverage). In this section, we will explore some of the Medicare 
and Medicaid financing options that are available and how they may meet the needs of 
rural areas.  
A. Full Capitation  
Full capitation is the type of payment most often cited in discussions of financial 
integration and certainly in the private commercial market, this is the usual method for 
integrating payments and services.  In a fully capitated plan, payment for all services are 
computed on a per person basis and an all inclusive rate is paid to a single entity that is 
financially responsible for the risks (profits and losses) associated with the capitation 
amount.  In order to accept a capitated payment, an organization must have appropriate 
administrative, management and organizational systems.  These include the ability to 
establish a network of providers and make payments to them, the ability to influence 
practice across those providers in order to meet quality assurance standards of the 
payers, systems capacity to monitor service use and meet specified reporting 
requirements, and perhaps most fundamentally, expertise at managing financial risk. Plans 
must also meet applicable state and federal licensure and insurance regulations.  The 
previous section included a description of the commercial, Medicare and Medicaid plans 
that are currently in operation and that include a full capitation payment. 
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B. Risk Sharing 
One of the biggest obstacles that new provider networks or organizations face in 
developing managed care products is how to manage and protect themselves from the 
financial risks associated with capitated payments.  This may be of particular concern in 
rural areas where the number of people enrolling in plans is low, making it difficult to 
spread risk. Risk sharing may be of interest not only to the contractors, but to payers, who 
have little interest in seeing new program contractors fail financially or reap untoward 
profits.  There are a number of ways to share risk in a managed care program.  Some of 
the more common ways are through the use of re-insurance, the establishment of risk 
corridors and the use of risk pools.  In its recent survey of State Medicaid managed care 
programs, the National Academy for State Health Policy found that 82% of states with 
Medicaid risk programs in 1998 (37 of 45 states) shared risk with contractors, up from 
59% in 1994 (19 of 32 states).  (Kaye et. al., 1999)  Interestingly, the use of risk sharing 
has increased along with the number of states that have risk programs. 
The use or purchase of re-insurance for high cost cases is one method of reducing 
financial losses in a managed care program.  Re-insurance can be structured in a number 
of different ways.  In Arizona, the state buys commercial reinsurance that covers the cost of 
care for individual cases that exceed certain thresholds.  For catastophic cases 
associated with certain pre-defined conditions, such as transplants or hemophilia, the 
reinsurance covers either a certain percentage of the costs or a pre-established amount for 
the condition.  In other states, the Medicaid agency itself offers re-insurance, or plans may 
be responsible for purchasing their own re-insurance. 
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Another way to minimize risk is through the use of risk corridors. Risk corridors 
define the ways in which losses and profits are divided between a plan or program and a 
payer. For example, in the PACE program, risk corridors were used in the first three start-
up years of the program to provide the time necessary to develop and refine the service 
system.  If a program's revenues exceeded its expenditures, a risk reserve was created 
that was used to fund losses or create a risk reserve for future years.  If the program's 
expenditures exceeded its revenues, the losses were shared by the program and the 
payer.  Corridors can also be used to assure skeptical stake holders (consumer groups, 
legislators, providers) that excessive profits will not be siphoned out of an area.  In the 
Texas Star+Plus program, for example, the State will share in profits that exceed 3%, and 
will reclaim all profit over 7%. (University of Maryland, Center on Aging, 1999) 
Finally, some State Medicaid programs have created risk pools by holding back a 
percentage of payments to contractors, and distributed the pool among plans based on 
relative occurrence of certain high-cost events.  This is in effect a form of group insurance 
that only applies in programs with multiple contractors.  
C. Partial Capitation  
The development and use of capitation payments that do not include all services in 
a single rate (but some subset of services) may be an attractive alternative for rural areas.  
The use of a partial capitation provides the opportunity for an organization to gain 
experience in managing the risk for a more limited number of services and to design the 
capitation to be specific to program goals.  Partial capitation can take many forms, 
depending on the goals of the program and capacity of the entity accepting the risk.   
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For example, the Carle Clinic, which operates in 42 predominantly rural counties 
around Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, participated in the national Medicare Community 
Nursing Organization (CNO) demonstration, in which a package of home health, outpatient 
therapies, durable and non-durable medical supplies and ambulance services were 
capitated, leaving hospital and other Medicare services fee-for-service.  In this program, 
the focus was on developing a nurse partner who would work with the physician to deliver 
and manage home care and home health services.  The partial capitation was developed 
to provide flexibility to the providers in designing service and care plans that met the needs 
of the patients without being constrained by the fee for service structure of payments and 
service delivery.  (Coburn, 1998) 
HCFA has expressed interest in testing broader applications of Medicare partial 
capitation.  Negotiations are currently underway with Massachusetts to develop a partially 
capitated Medicare payment as part of the State’s Senior Care Organization (SCO) 
demonstration.  In his conceptual analysis of Medicare partial capitation, Joseph 
Newhouse (1998) has argued that it provides the best of both worlds:  the capitated portion 
of the payment promotes cost consciousness and flexibility of benefits, while the fee-for-
service component supports appropriate access to needed services.  Such a payment 
system is not, however, easy to implement.  Because of the potential for cost shifting from 
capitated benefits to those that remain fee-for-service, the partial capitation must be 
carefully designed to support program goals.  Furthermore, a partial capitation system is 
much more cumbersome to administer, since provider billing systems and payer 
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reimbursement systems must be able to recognize which services qualify for fee-for-
service reimbursement and which are prepaid in a partial capitation. 
Medicaid programs have used various forms of partial capitation in the design of 
managed long term care programs.  In the Minnesota Senior Health Options program, for 
example, the capitation payment for Medicaid long term care services includes only six 
months of nursing facility liability.  Beyond six months, the managed care organization 
continues to be responsible for the member's care, but receives a supplemental nursing 
facility payment.  (Booth et. al., 1997)  The State of Minnesota would have preferred to 
extend MSHO risk to include unlimited nursing facility services, but was concerned that 
managed care plans would not be willing to take on unlimited risk until they had gained 
experience in the MSHO program.   
State Medicaid programs have also used partial capitation extensively to carve out 
services that have historically been provided by a certain established network of providers.  
Common examples of this include mental health services and transportation.   
Partial capitation has also been used to create Prepaid Health Plans (PHPs) while 
States await federal Medicaid waivers. Defined in Medicaid regulations as encompassing 
a "non-comprehensive" package of services, PHPs are responsible for some, but not all 
Medicaid services under a partial capitation.   
Several PACE sites have used the PHP strategy to operate as "pre-PACE" sites 
while awaiting waivers to operate under full Medicaid and Medicare authority.  While the 
PHP option has allowed new sites to gain experience before operating under full 
capitation, it has not generally been financially advantageous for pre-PACE sites, since 
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they have not been able to offset expanded community long term care services against 
Medicare revenue during the pre-PACE period.  (State Work Group on PACE, 1999)   
D. Administration Service Arrangements 
The integrated financing approaches that have been discussed so far involve some 
kind of capitated or partially capitated payment arrangement and the assumption of some 
risk.  For rural providers that are interested in managed care, the administrative, 
management and financial responsibilities of developing a managed care product may 
seem overwhelming. One option that some provider networks have used is to contract with 
an insurance organization to manage the administrative aspects of the program, such as 
billing, service utilization reporting and risk management.  For organizations that are in a 
start-up phase and trying to develop the organization and service delivery structures for 
managing and coordinating care, partnering with an insurance or other administrative 
organization may be attractive.  This gives the program time to develop an organizational 
infrastructure and medical management plan that can become the basis for a more formal 
managed care organization.   
E. Managed Fee for Service/Coordination of Care  
Many rural areas do not have the population base, access to services or provider 
base to make even a partial capitation feasible.  Furthermore, long-established referral 
patterns, provider relationships, and patient preferences may not be amenable to the 
organizational and administrative requirements of managed care organizations.  
Neverthless, the interest in and need to provide better ways to coordinate acute and long 
term care services remains a high priority for many rural areas.  In these areas, more 
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modest approaches may best meet the needs and goals of the community. One approach 
is to strengthen the management and coordination of services and particularly the services 
of people with extensive and ongoing needs. Medicaid programs have developed and 
implemented Primary Care Case Management Programs (PCCM) for a number of years.  
In a PCCM program, the Medicaid program contracts with Primary Care Providers (PCPs) 
to coordinate and authorize service use for a panel of beneficiaries.  Historically, the 
PCCM programs have been used primarily for younger adults and families rather than the 
elderly, but some States are now looking at adapting the model for elders in need of long 
term care services.   
For example,  Maine has proposed linking the PCP to its long term care system 
through the use of a care partner, envisioned as a nurse practioner or similarly qualified 
person.  Providers would continue to be reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis. When 
Maine issued a Request for Information as part of its MaineNET rural integration 
demonstration, no commercial plans expressed any serious interest.  MaineNET was 
proposed for three rural counties in central and northern Maine, offering a target group of 
15,000 beneficiaries dispersed over 11,528 square miles, over a third of the State's land 
mass. (Maine Department of Human Services, 1998)  The State has among the lowest 
penetration rates of managed care in the country and, although the managed care market 
is beginning to heat up in the more populated southern portion of the State, commercial 
plans are not yet rushing to the northern reaches.   
As a result of the RFI, Maine redesigned its model, moving away from capitated 
HMO payments and opting instead for an enhanced Primary Care Case Management 
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model, in which payments will continue to be fee-for-service but will be monitored closely by 
the State, and nurse practitioners will be deployed to forge better links between high-
volume primary care practices and the State’s existing long term care benefits 
management agency. (Maine Department of Human Services, 1999)    
Still untested is the potential for closely coordinating Medicare and Medicaid 
services in a PCCM model.  One obstacle to overcome will be for States to obtain access 
to live Medicare data if they are to monitor both Medicare and Medicaid.  Also unclear is 
how Medicare and Medicaid incentives can be lined up when both remain fee-for-service.   
Two other rural New England States, Vermont and New Hampshire, are exploring 
ways to assist existing long term care providers with integration efforts.  Vermont has 
created regional coalitions of community providers as part of a legislatively mandated 
effort to shift the balance of its long term care system toward community-based services.  
Depending on how the coalitions evolve and whether they are willing to bear risk, they are 
potential future vehicles for financial integration.  In Cheshire County, New Hampshire, a 
group of providers is working with the State to develop an integrated package of long term 
care services, but its unclear at this stage whether Medicaid services will be capitated and 
if so, how the providers will establish a single business entity through which they could 
accept integrated payments and share risk.  (New England States Consortium, 1999.)  
V. Conclusion 
Full capitation of multiple funding streams is generally considered the most effective 
way to support the clinical integration of acute and long term care for the following reasons: 
• It creates a pool of flexible financing; 
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• It creates incentives to use less institutional care and stimulates the development of 
community-based alternatives; and 
• It eliminates cost shifting among payers and perverse utilization incentives inherent 
in fee-for-service. 
Full risk capitation, however, may be most applicable in urban settings where 
managed care infrastructure, including experience in risk management, is better 
developed, where excess capacity in certain sectors lends itself to discount pricing and 
where large numbers of consumers can be enrolled to spread risk.  Many rural areas have 
none or few of these characteristics, and may have goals, such as protection of the existing 
service delivery system, that conflict with the use of full capitation. 
A number of alternatives to full capitation have emerged and will be refined as 
experience is gained.  Rural areas considering integration projects should consider 
carefully whether full capitation is feasible or desired and develop a financing and payment 
system that suits their needs. 
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